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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 
 
The European Union (EU) has been actively working as a counter-terrorism actor since 
the horrendous 9/11 terror attacks in New York. The Europeans noticed they were also 
threatened by Al Qaeda’s violent views on Islam. As a response, the EU adopted counter-
terrorism policies and EU leaders started urging for cooperation in this scope. In 2004 
and 2005 Europe suffered from two deadly terror attacks, the bombings in Madrid and in 
London, respectively. The EU reacted by implementing the 2005 Counter terror Strategy, 
which would shape European counter-terrorism policies. 
 
Furthermore, these events generated the feeling Europe was vulnerable to jihadist terror. 
European leaders understood the necessity of coming together and co-operating with 
regards to terrorism. They felt their security, democracy and values were being brutally 
attacked. Fighting Islamist terrorism became a top priority for the European Union and 
its Member States. Since 2001 European integration and cooperation in terms of counter-
terrorism have significantly developed.  
 
The aim of this paper is mainly to analyze the evolution of European counter-terrorism 
institutions, mechanisms and policies within the EU system since the 9/11 attacks. Then, 
a critical view on how deeply Member States were able to cooperate, especially 
concerning intelligence sharing. Furthermore, aspects such as European integration in 
security-related areas, particularly Jihadist terrorism, were considered fundamental to the 
progress of this paper. Subsequently, the efficiency of the European Union counter-
terrorism measures was evaluated to answer the question of how effective European 
integration is against security threats such as Islamist radical violence. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: a brief explanation of Jihadist terrorism in Europe, 
contextual factors for Islamist radicalization of European individuals and residents 
accompanied by a short description of homegrown terrorism in Europe. After, the EU’s 
initial responses to Jihadist attacks are divided into two relevant periods. The post 9/11 
reaction and the subsequent impact of the Lisbon Treaty on European counter-terrorism. 
Then, the new wave of terrorism in Europe is addressed in two subchapters. The first 
chapter details how terrorist cells operate, the second outlines how the 2015 Paris attacks 
were carried out. Consequently, the EU first responses to the Paris attacks and the 
counter-terrorism measures implemented post-Paris 2015 are studied in order to 
understand the EU counter-terrorism policies. Afterwards, an analysis of other EU’s 
counter-terrorism mechanisms such as Europol and how cooperation with the United 
States is executed. Finally, the conclusions will present the findings with a more critical 
view. 
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The research for this paper is principally based on two categories of information: primary 
sources (official documents of the European Union and of Europol on terrorism-related 
matters), and literature on European counter-terrorism, on terrorism in Europe in general, 
on European integration and cooperation as second resources. However, evidence taken 
from newspapers were also used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter II: Islamist Terrorism in Europe 
 
 
 
This chapter offers a short overview of issues such as radicalization and homegrown 
terrorism in Europe. The first subchapter describes variables that can lead to the 
radicalization of European individuals or residents. Some of these key variables such as 
low integration, discrimination, economic and societal segregation of Muslim minorities 
help to understand the radicalization process. As a consequence, subchapter two explores 
the causes of the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism. Homegrown terrorism is the acts 
of violence carried out by a radicalized individual in their country of residence against 
their fellow citizens. 
 
 
 
 Contextual Factors for Islamist Radicalization 
 
 
 
Europe has a growing Muslim minority. Originally, Europe received a large flow of 
Muslim immigrants to help with the reconstruction of the continent post-second world 
war, which later resulted in family reunification and asylum requests. In France, Muslims 
constitute the 8.8% of the population, 8.1% in Sweden, 7.6% in Belgium, 7.1% in the 
Netherlands, 6.9% in Austria, 6.3% in the United Kingdom and 6.1% in Germany. 
Overall, the Muslim community constitutes 4.9% of the European population (Pew 
Research Center, 2017). The nationality of Muslim immigrants varies according to the 
European country. North Africans tend to immigrate to France, Spain and Belgium. South 
Asians in the United Kingdom while Turks are likely to go to Germany. However, a new 
wave of Muslim immigrants from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria in Europe can be noticed. 
This is due to internal conflicts in these countries. 
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For many, Muslim immigration in Europe can often be related to the end of the European 
colonial rule (Gallis et. al., 2005). Furthermore, they are normally poorly educated and 
unqualified immigrants from rural parts of their home country. In addition, they generally 
arrived in very traditional and closed societies (Lebl, 2010). Other factors, such as the 
high rate of birth among the Muslim population and the social and political instability of 
their home countries are also associated with the increment of Muslims in Europe. Lebl 
(2010) claims there always was a lack of will on the part of European’s government and 
native citizens in assimilating their Muslim population. This negatively affected the 
integration process of these individuals. 
 Likewise, the generous welfare state of the majority of European states and Europe’s 
multiculturalism are also variables that can explain why the integration of Muslims in 
Europe is low (Koopmans, 2009). Koopmans (2009) claims generous welfare state and 
multiculturalist policies contribute to the creation of Muslim ghettos. That is because 
Muslim immigrants prefer to live with their own ethnic groups and speak their own 
national language. Hence, there is barely any interaction between immigrants and natives. 
The social interaction between natives and immigrants has a considerable impact on 
access to the labour market for immigrants (Granovetter, 1973). For Goodhart’s 
Progressive Dilemma (2004), generous welfare states tend to attract unskilled and 
uneducated workers, once they feel financially protected. As a consequence, immigrants 
depend on the State which is viewed negatively by native citizens. It causes economic 
and social segregation and the marginalization of Muslim immigrants.  
 
European commitment to multiculturalism allowed Muslim immigrants and their children 
to separate themselves from European culture and values such as gender equality, rule of 
law and liberalism (Lebl, 2010). Even though there is a variety of nationalities and 
traditions in the Muslim population residing in Europe, the creation of Muslim 
neighbourhoods outside the European the way of life spectrum contributed to the 
establishment of very traditional and conservative Muslim communities throughout 
Europe. Accordingly, a new European Islam started being perpetrated. 
 
Education and the treatment of religious institutions by European states are also key 
factors. For instance, the vast majority of countries in Europe allowed Islamic schools 
and mosques administrated by imams and Muslim teachers from outside EU to function. 
Very often, these imams and these teachers have a basic comprehension of the cultural 
aspects and the language of the EU country they were working in. Additionally, it was 
proven that in many cases the imams had the intention to spread a more extreme view of 
Islam. Thus, radicalizing young European Muslims (Gallis et. at., 2005). 
 
A very important aspect is the fact that during many years of Muslim immigration in 
Europe European authorities did not pay attention to the growing issue of the isolation of 
their Muslim minorities. Simultaneously, racism and discrimination toward Muslim 
communities escalated the conflict between Muslims and the native Europeans. Ledl 
(2010) argues that there was a separated Muslim Europe, where sharia law was not only 
above European values but replacing it. As a cause of it, the European authorities were 
unable to successfully address the early stages of the radical Islam issue in Europe. 
 
Even though the failure to integrate Muslim immigrants or any other group of immigrants 
for that matter, could result in social exclusion not much was done by the authorities to 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                                                                                                                     Nº 6/2019, 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2019 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
  
 
9 
 
correct this. Thus, resulting in the progress of extremism or criminal activity to all 
Member States, because of the open borders agreements. The responsibility to create and 
implement integration policies is primarily of each single Member State. The European 
Union does not have direct competence on integration. There is, however, a European 
forum made for EU countries’ leaders and relevant stakeholders to debate the challenges 
that are equal to them. The aim is to seek common solutions and cooperative strategies 
within the EU mechanisms (Gallis et. al., 2005). Nevertheless, EU officials are concerned 
that promoting integration initiatives focusing on Muslim communities in order to fight 
the radical Islam ideology may have the opposite effect. The argument is that it can 
deepen the feelings of social segregation and discrimination among some Muslim 
individuals.   
The European Commission proposed a “Common Agenda for Integration” in 2005. The 
main goal of this document was to encourage EU Member States to adhere to the basic 
principles of the integration policies. It advocated integration measures such as promoting 
inter-faith dialogue, increasing the presence of immigrant women in the labour market, 
and allowing the nationals of third countries to participate in local elections (Gallis et. al., 
2005). The aim of the European Commission’s “Common Agenda for Integration” was 
to further the assimilation of Muslim and other groups of immigrants residing inside the 
EU, taking actions at both national and European level. However, the “Common Agenda 
for Integration” was more of a guideline to be followed by Member States, it was not 
binding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Homegrown Terrorism in Europe 
 
 
 
Before September 11th 2001 violent Islamist movements were connected mainly to 
domestic political problems faced by Middle East and North African States (Nesser, 
2004). Al Qaida’s attack on the United States inspired the expansion of radical Islam in 
Western countries. The origin of Jihadist groups in Europe was not determined by 
national borders. The groups follow the Salafi-Jihadi ideology and are motivated by 
similar grievances to carry out terror attacks on European soil. These radical movements 
have a sophisticated approach of spreading violent Islam in Europe and cooperate with 
each other beyond national borders, bringing a transnational dynamic to homegrown 
terrorism in Europe (Nesser, 2004). 
 
Homegrown terrorism is very complex and especially challenging for European 
governments. Homegrown terrorism implies that European citizens and residents of 
European countries are willing to commit horrendous acts of violence against their fellow 
nationals (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). The main target of homegrown terrorism 
violence is civilians. This tendency appeared after the 9/11 Al Qaeda’s attacks as a form 
of political violence. Homegrown terrorism is a self-generating and self-sustained 
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phenomenon. It is very easy to conduct an attack and very difficult for authorities to 
prevent it. 
 
To understand homegrown terrorism in Europe it is important to take four important 
aspects into consideration (Nesser, 2004). The first one is the globalist ideology present 
in Jihadist ideology. The second one is how the structure and domestic issues of Middle 
East and North African countries contribute to transnational violent Islam approach. The 
third one is the economic and technological inequality present in globalization.  The 
fourth aspect is the international geopolitical events that inspired radical Islamist 
movements worldwide. 
 
Differentiating itself from traditional Jihadist terrorism, the perpetrators of homegrown 
terrorist atrocities are European citizens or residents. Wilner and Dubouloz (2010) claim 
the radicalization process is critical to convince individuals to sign up to jihadist militancy 
and homegrown terrorism. According to them, radicalization refers to the emotional and 
mental change that individuals undergo to adhere to the radical views of Islam and 
international politics. To summarize, radicalization legitimises the use of extreme 
violence in order to achieve a personal ideal of society, politics and religion. Generally, 
the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants or long-term residents that did not 
integrate well in European society (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). New Muslim converts 
also tend to follow radical Islam terrorism as they do not know the basic principles of 
Islam. Therefore, they are easily radicalized.  
 
Although the radicalization process is different for each person and is as unique as a 
fingerprint, patterns can be found (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). For example, individuals 
with fragile links to European values have a stronger inclination to adhere to the Jihadist 
ideology (De Hertogh, 2016). Second and third-generation immigrants of Muslim 
background who are willing to strengthen their identity and new Muslim converts are 
generally easily radicalized. According to Wilner and Dubouloz’s (2010) transformative 
learning theory, other triggering factors such as racism, discrimination, unemployment, 
Muslim identity crisis, international conflict in Muslim countries and troubled family can 
also facilitate the radicalization process of these individuals. 
 
Once radicalized the individuals accept extremes interpretation of Islam as the truth to be 
guided by. The jihadist ideology present in radical Islam calls for a “holy war” on Western 
societies (Precht, 2007). It states “infidels” must be faced with violence to establish 
Allah’s will and rule in the world. The war against the West is a way of living in Jihad. 
Individuals are indoctrinated by their imams. There is a belief that actions of violence 
must be taken for the support of the “Muslim cause.” 
 
Islamists radicals know exactly what group of people to recruit and radicalized. Park 
(2006) says radicals target vulnerable groups. Normally, they are young individuals that 
are lost in the clash between the Islamic background of their family and the multicultural 
European society. Also, there is the feeling of not belonging or not fitting into the 
European country they were born or live in. It translates to feeling the need to find or 
protect their identity. As a consequence, they perceive European values as threatening.  
In addition, the socio-economic situation is a contributing factor. Data shows Muslims in 
Europe tend to be concentrated in the middle-low or low class. Most of the time they are 
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uneducated, unskilled and unemployed. In Europe,  a citizen born into a Muslim family 
is much less likely to be hired for a job than a Christian born European. Studies suggest 
that in Central and North European countries the native Europeans favour Christian 
applicants over Muslim ones for a job position (Teich, 2016). Second and third-generation 
Muslims face the same financial issues their parents had when they first arrived in Europe 
during the 1970 and 1980s. 
 
There is a significant growth in the number of European individuals eager to join terrorist 
cells, to commit horrendous terrorist attacks against their fellow citizens and willing to 
travel to Syria or Iraq to join terrorist cells there. It is estimated that over 5.000 Europeans 
are directly connected to terrorist cells in Western Europe. Since 2003, over 13,156 
European citizens travelled to Iraq or Syria to fight alongside terrorist groups 
(International Centre for Study of Radicalization, 2019). 
 
 
 
Chapter III: First Responses 
 
 
 
This chapter focus on two periods of the EU’s first response to the Jihadist terrorist threat 
in Europe. First, the subchapter will analyze the policies made after 9/11, as the 
beginning of European counter-terrorism institutional cooperation. Subchapter two 
examines the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU counter-terrorism capacities. 
 
 
 
Post 9/11 EU 
 
 
 
Terrorism is not new to Europe. Anarchist terrorism in the early 1920s was very violent. 
In the 1970 and 1980s, many European countries suffered terrorist attacks from extreme 
left and right or separatist organizations. Terrorism was considered a relevant issue in 
countries like Spain, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland. European leaders 
knew the sharing of intelligence and the lessons learned from facing terrorism threats 
were needed (Rehak, Foltin and Holcner, 2007). Accordingly, in the face of the growth 
of terrorism threats in the 1970s the European Council created the Trevi Group, an 
informal intergovernmental platform for cooperation in the areas of law and order. Trevi 
stands for the French words “terrorisme, radicalisme, extremisme et violence 
internationale” and its first meeting was held in Luxembourg.  
 
It was proposed by the British government in December 1975 in Rome. It is important to 
note that the Trevi Group worked outside the structure of the European institutions 
(Rakovská, 2014). The members of the Trevi Group were the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal and Greece. 
Their intention was to facilitate police cooperation between Member states. It was the 
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basis for the creation of Europol. In 1991 Germany formally presented the proposal for 
the creation of a European Police. Thus, in 1992 the European Police Office (Europol) 
was established by the Maastricht Treaty. Other tools were also introduced following the 
Tampere meetings. 
 
Nevertheless, the mechanisms of cooperation that were designed had a voluntary scope. 
Many European states preferred to maintain issues regarding security as a private 
domestic matter. Multilateral cooperation was only through informal arrangements 
(Abdelsamad, 2018). It is relevant, however, to appreciate the historical background at 
the time these instruments were settled. Terrorism prevention did not have the importance 
it has today. Terrorism was seen as a domestic matter strongly related to social and 
political national issues. Thus, there was no need for counter-terrorism policies at the 
European level. 
 
One event changed the course and the scope of terrorism not only in Europe but around 
the globe. Al Qaeda’s horrendous, yet successful, attacks of 11th September 2001 on 
American soil. While the news of the United States being attacked was across European 
media, there was a strong fear the European Institutions would also be targeted. It was 
the first time Western societies understood they a target for jihadist terrorists.  
 
The European Union (EU) interpreted the 9/11atrocious attacks as a necessity for further 
cooperation between Member States, principally in terms of counter-terrorism policies 
(Den Boer, 2003). The first response to 9/11 was the European Council’s Plan of Action 
on the 21st September 2001. The Plan of Action incorporated the routine exchange of 
information between Member States, Europol and US authorities and the creation of joint 
investigation teams of police and magistrates from EU countries and the establishment of 
a body for coordination, the Eurojust (European Commission, 2002). Following this, the 
EU initiated the European Commission Action, which adopted a common definition of 
terrorism within the Union and 64 measures to fight terrorist activities in Europe 
(memo/02/122). In 2003 terrorism was considered as one of the main threats to the lives 
of European citizens (European Council, 2003).  
 
In 2004, Al Qaeda detonated 10 bombs on trains in Madrid, killing 192 people and leaving 
1,600 injured. It was the most vicious terror attack ever carried out in Europe (Lia and 
Hegghammer, 2004). A year later, 39 people were murdered in suicide bomb attacks in 
London. The brutality of these attacks served as a wake-up call for European countries to 
strengthen their cooperation in matters of counter-terrorism.  
 
The Jihadist ideology was a growing phenomenon in Europe. Factors such as political 
discontentment with foreign policies, political alienation, unsuccessful integration in the 
case of immigrants and of second and third generations of immigrants, unemployment, 
troubled family background, and radical religious views were facilitating the 
radicalization process. Homegrown terrorism was now a reality in Europe.  
 
European governments discovered Islamist terrorism was even more violent than those 
of separatist groups, and that there was a growing network of Al Qaeda’s devotees in 
Europe (Argomaniz, 2010). The Islamist terror phenomenon forced the European 
authorities to recognize they needed to work together. It led the European Union to a 
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dynamic and progressive institutionalization of counter-terrorism policies. Hence, 
counter-terrorism cooperation was now seen as a priority to the EU (Edwards and Meyer, 
2008). Subsequently, the EU started gaining legitimacy on security-related issues, 
especially terrorism. As a result, many counter-terrorism strategies were implemented. 
In 2005 the European Union formulated the Counter-terror Strategy, which was 
structured in four core pillars: to prevent, protect, pursue and respond to terrorism on a 
global scale (Lugna, 2006). The aim of the document was to enable a consistent European 
response to jihadist terrorism. However, Argomaniz (2010) argues the 2005 Counter-
terror Strategy was more of a report of the EU’s counter-terrorism policy developed since 
2001 than a guiding reference on counter-terrorism strategy. Thus, according to 
Argomaniz (2010), it served more as a marketing instrument. 
 
The EU’s counter-terrorism efforts were for many times seen as insufficient and 
accumulative by critics (Keohane, 2005). Nevertheless, substantial institutional 
development at the European level could be noticed. For instance, regarding police and 
intelligence cooperation, the 2005 Counter-terror Strategy advocated the exchange of 
information and intelligence between Member States. It contributed to the foundation of 
a dedicated anti-terrorism unit in the Commission, specific counter-terrorism groups 
within the Council, and the creation of specialized teams in terrorism within Europol and 
Eurojust (Gregory, 2005). 
 
Consequently, the 2005 Counter-terror Strategy intensified collaboration in other areas 
of counter-terrorism, such as the judicial cooperation, customs control and border 
security, infrastructure and transport protection, response management, anti-terrorism 
financing, anti-radicalization and terrorist recruitment. These seven sectors developed as 
a response to the Madrid and London attacks form the basis of EU counter-terrorism 
framework today. 
 
The 2005 Counter-terror Strategy translated into significant structural changes within the 
EU counter-terrorism policy. The EU bodies responsible for it gained more power and 
material resources in terrorist-related matters. Also, even though not sufficiently, 
intelligence exchange improved. In addition, it reaffirms the EU commitment to support 
Member States in the fight against terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon  
 
 
 
 
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and THE Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) started a new era for European counter-terrorism policy. The 
TEU established that one of the main goals of the Union was to provide EU citizens with 
a greater level of security. Article 3 of TEU acknowledges this goal by declaring the EU 
must offer justice, freedom and security to all its citizens within its territory. Article 83 
of TFEU complements the EU competence on counter-terrorism by offering legal tools 
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for the EU to act on terrorist matters. It says the European Parliament and the Council 
must implement directives in order to fight transnational crimes, such as terrorism. 
Furthermore, article 83 of TFUE explicitly calls for the need to combat such crime on a 
common basis (Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 2007). 
 
These treaties have a relevant impact on European counter-terrorism policies and 
capacities, especially inside the EU. This is due to the competences and powers the EU 
gained through the TEU and TFEU in areas of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). To sum 
up, the treaties offer the EU three core pillars, the first one is related to intergovernmental 
capacities, the second one to foreign policy, and the third one to JHA. It is important 
because the JHA competencies are now shared between Member States and the EU 
(Renard, 2012). 
 
The EU improved its role in internal security. The post-Lisbon era facilitates the process 
of decision-making by the EU. The European Parliament and national parliaments benefit 
from the Lisbon Treaty as well. The European Parliament acquired codecisional and 
oversight powers. National parliaments gained influence over Europol and the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSPD). Even the European Court of Justice (ECJ) furthered 
its reach under the Lisbon Treaty. Now the ECJ has extended powers in all areas related 
to freedom, security and justice. It all results in more counter-terrorism power for the EU. 
For example, the Commission is now able to initiate proceedings against Member States 
before the ECJ in security-related matters (Argomaniz, Bures and Kaunert, 2015). 
 
On the other hand, article 4 of TEU  states the EU must recognize Member States 
fundamental rights to essential sovereign matters, such as national security. Article 72 of 
TFEU complements article 4 of TEU by adding EU competencies in the fields of Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice should not affect national security-related policies 
(European Parliament, 2018). This brings a certain level of institutional complexity to 
European counter-terrorism. However, the Lisbon Treaty specified how far the EU can 
legislate in the areas of shared competences and the instruments available to the EU to 
execute decisions. 
 
Another important aspect the impact the Treaty of Lisbon has on EU counter-terrorism is 
the development of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Fundamental rights and the rule 
of law are two very important principles formalized in Lisbon. Even though the fight 
against terrorism in Europe is seen as a priority to both EU and national authorities, it 
should not influence civil rights or the liberties of EU citizens. Nevertheless, many 
counter-terrorism efforts do affect some civil rights and freedom. 
 
Franke (2017), made a very critical point regarding the efficiency of EU counter-
terrorism. He claims that despite the powers the Lisbon Treaty gave to the EU in terms 
of counter-terrorism capacities, it is still limited by Member States lack of interest in 
counter-terrorism integration. Thus, according to Franke (2017), EU counter-terrorism is 
not as effective as it could be. However, Kaunert (2010) disagrees. He argues that 
Member States’ interest in cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism delivers from 
cooperation itself. For him, EU countries enthusiasm is, in part, shaped by EU norms. 
This means the first domestic aspect of Member States are affected by their interaction 
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with EU institutions and their structures. Thus, conditioning Member States’ initial 
interests to a closer European view. 
 
Other key European counter-terrorism players, such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex 
were given legal personality in the Treaty of Lisbon. These agencies gained the capacity 
to reach international agreements, which is evidenced by agreements between Europol, 
Eurojust and the US. At times these two EU agencies work closely with the FBI and the 
CIA. For Frontex, some relevant changes are also noticed after the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
main one is the establishment of an “integrated management system for external borders” 
(Renard, 2012). The activities of these agencies are overseen and scrutinized by the 
European Parliament. 
 
The improvements received by agencies such as Europol and the increment of EU 
counter-terrorism competences after the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU relevance in the fight 
against terrorism in the international scenario (Kaunert, 2010). The EU received 
significant legislative power in police and judicial cooperation, and the strengthening of 
the ECJ facilitates the European mandate by giving the EU the position to defend its 
policies at an international level. Kaunert (2010) claims this crucial evolution of the EU 
capacity to fight terrorism and the international actorness of the EU will improve, for 
example, the EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation. He says the Treaty of Lisbon 
harmonizes the EU-US control of security policies. Thus, both the EU and the US benefit 
from a more integrated European counter-terrorism position. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: The New Wave of Terrorism in Europe 
 
 
 
Chapter number four investigate the new waves of terrorism influenced especially by the 
so-called Islamic State terrorist group in Europe. The initial subchapter explains the 
tendencies and the new forms terrorist cells operate and the challenges authorities have 
tracking them down. As a consequence, the second subchapter is about the horrendous 
Paris attacks of 2015, and how the terrorists involved were able to execute such a deadly 
attack. 
 
 
 
How terrorist cells operate 
 
 
The American invasion of Iraq after 9/11 helped Jihadist radicals to spread anti-Western 
rhetoric in the Muslim populations all around the world, including in Europe 
(Hegghammer and Nesser, 2015). 
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Islamist terrorism is widely different than the extreme left or nationalist terrorist 
movements that terrorized Europe in the years 1970 and 1980s. Even though, both strands 
of terrorism act with violence and are convinced there are revolutionary aspects in their 
violence that are going to create a better world. Islamist radicals are motivated by religion 
and try to kill indiscriminately as many people as possible. Jihadist terrorist groups of the 
21st century, Precht (2007) argues belong to much smaller and organizations. Normally 
of 10 to 20 individuals, with a clear line of hierarchy defined.  
 
The internet plays a significant role in these terrorist groups. It facilitates the propaganda 
machine of the terrorist cells, making recruitment of individuals very simple. The internet 
is a cheap and anonymous resource that widely spreads the terrorist propaganda on a scale 
never seen before. It offers platforms where terrorist cells exchange information and 
contacts.  It is the key tool for the radicalization process of young Europeans. Authorities 
have an extremely difficult time trying to track down the culprits behind these terrorist 
pages. As a result, radical Islam is easily globalized. 
 
In the case of the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London 2005, authorities found over 50 
Jihad-related electronic books in the hard drive of the perpetrators (Felter, 2007). Manuals 
on military operations and guides on how to handle interrogations in case of arrest. were 
also found. Also, the internet is used by terrorists to find instructions on how to make 
homemade bombs (Karagiannis, 2017). Spanish authorities believe that the Madrid 
suicidal bomber was a case of self-radicalization. 
 
Another aspect of how terrorist cells work in Europe are prisons. Bakker’s (2007) studies 
show that over 246 European Jihadists before 2008 were in prisons prior to their 
radicalization.  Mueller (2006) suggests that accepting radical Islam may justify the 
violent tendencies some criminals have. Therefore, being imprisoned together with 
radicals may influence individuals to adhere to radicalization Nevertheless, some authors, 
such as El-Hassan (2007) believe Islam can also offer a moral framework to criminals to 
re-start their life. Research shows young European tend to be easily radicalized by 
terrorist groups in prison. Prison imams have a particular power position, which makes 
them successful when radicalizing individuals in prisons (Van Duyn, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, evidence suggests there are a few mosques associated with radicalization. 
They may serve as a tool of recruitment for some terrorist cells in Europe. The Fourqaan 
Mosque in Eindhoven in the Netherlands and the Finsbury Mosque in London in the 
United Kingdom were directly connected with Jihadist ideology (Karagiannis, 2017). 
Although, recent studies say terrorist cells are moving away from mosques to work at 
private homes. A report by the House of Commons (2006) claims attending mosques 
linked to radical Islam can contribute to the process of pre-radicalization. The report 
states, extremists search for potential recruits inside these kinds of mosques. 
 
The terrorist cells in Europe train through paramilitary activities at home, camping and 
martial arts. Even paintball and white-water rafting are used by these groups in order to 
prepare to travel to Iraq and Syria to join the so-called Islamic State and to get ready for 
a terror attack. Two of the London 2004 bombers prepared for the attack by joining the 
National White Water Centre in North Wales a few weeks prior (House of Commons 
Report, 2006). 
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Trips to Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir and Pakistan are also crucial for European terrorist 
groups. Not only does it provide a network of contacts and resources but also serves as 
ideological reinforcement (Karagiannis, 2017). Furthermore, travelling to these countries 
offers practical experience. Overseas travel is fundamental for small European terrorist 
cells because it is a way of joining the terrorist groups they are inspired by. For many 
counter-terrorism specialists, it is the final catalyst for these groups. After their experience 
abroad, they get ready to carry out attacks in Europe.  
 
Some scholars suggest terrorists use criminal activities to help finance their operations. 
Drug trade and the commerce of counterfeit products are a significant source of terrorist’s 
incomes (Napoleoni, 2009). Many terrorist groups also have genuine businesses to 
generate funding, but also to be used as a front for money laundering (Kaplan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, charity is the biggest resource of money for terrorist groups. According to 
Kaplan (2004), terrorists receive a lot of donations, especially from wealthy men. For 
many years, charities based in Saudi Arabia funded Al Qaeda, for example. In addition 
to that, new technologies, such as the cryptocurrency bitcoin, are also being used by 
terrorist organizations as a source of income for their criminal activities. 
 
To sum up, this overview of how terrorist cells work can be translated into one 
conclusion. It is very difficult for European authorities to prevent terrorist attacks in 
Europe in such conditions. To control internet propaganda, prison and mosque’s 
radicalization, even paramilitary activities and overseas trips are very sensitive matters. 
Tracking down terrorist money is also a very complex task. It calls for highly 
sophisticated cooperation between European countries. Not only to give strict security 
and judicial based response, but also to have a more social approach. 
 
 
 
2015 Paris Attacks 
 
 
 
The growth of radicalization resulted in the worst acts of violence Europe has faced since 
the end of World War Two. The operational capabilities of terrorist cells operating on 
European soil and the facilities they possess to carry out attacks are surprisingly worrying. 
Even though European countries have been trying to work together through EU 
mechanisms to fight terrorist activities in Europe, homegrown terrorism is still one big 
issue to European security. 
 
The truth is the majority of countries still prefer to take counter-terrorism measures at the 
national level than at the European level. There is a perception that domestic security is 
a matter of sovereignty, with little space for EU level intervention. This view interferes 
with the outcome of counter-terrorism cooperation.  In addition to that, the appearance of 
the so-called Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) terrorist group in 2011 and its 
dominance in incentivizing attacks on Western States did not facilitate the effect of 
counter-terrorism policies in Europe. On the contrary, ISIS seems to be even more 
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successful in radicalizing Western individuals than Al Qaeda ever was. The 2015 Paris 
attacks is an example. 
 
The 13th November of 2015 was a dark day in Paris. 130 civilians lost their lives to an 
atrocious terrorist attack and 494 were left injured.  A series of carefully planned and 
violent attacks designed to murder as many people as possible were executed in crowded 
spots of the city. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the orchestrator of these horrendous attacks was 
well known to European intelligence services for his implications with the so-called 
Islamic State. He travelled to Syria to fight along the ISIS and was even trained by them.  
Abaaoud was a Belgian national of Moroccan descent. He was raised and educated in the 
Brussels’ district of Molenbeek. Molenbeek is a fairly poor neighbourhood with high 
rates of unemployment home to the majority of the Muslim population living in Brussels. 
According to the former French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, the 28 years old 
Belgian terrorist was confirmed to be involved in four foiled attacks in the spring of 2015 
in France (BBC, 2015).  
 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud and other 9 jihadist terrorists heavily armed with assault rifles and 
explosives were able to bomb inside and outside the stadium, the French national team 
was playing against Germany, and were the former president of France, François 
Hollande was. They fired and killed over 58 people in restaurants, bars and even a concert 
in Paris (CNN, 2015). The sophistication and the organization of the attacks allowed the 
terrorist to maximise the deaths of civilians with ease. 
 
In 2014 the so-called Islamic State updated a video on YouTube where Abaaoud appears 
in a vehicle dragging mutilated bodies behind it. Also, before the Paris attacks, he was 
arrested for his links with terrorist groups in the Belgian city of Verviers (BBC, 2015). 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud was not worried about keeping his jihadist terrorist tendencies a 
secret. After returning to Belgium from Syria he gave an interview to the English 
magazine of the so-called Islamic State Daqib. He openly talked about the attacks he was 
planning on Europe. He said he came back to "set up a safe house while we planned to 
carry out operations against the crusaders". He bragged "The intelligence knew me from 
before as I had been previously imprisoned by them. I was even stopped by an officer 
who contemplated me so as to compare me to the picture, but he let me go, as he did not 
see the resemblance! This was nothing but a gift from Allah." He keeps “My name and 
picture were all over the news, yet I was able to stay in their homeland, plan operations 
against them, and leave safely when doing so become necessary. I ask Allah to accept the 
fruitful deeds of the martyrs.” (The Guardian, 2015). 
 
Abaaoud is just another tragic example of the homegrown terrorist problem in Europe. 
Furthermore, the Paris attacks carried out by him exposed the European counter-terrorism 
dilemma. Intelligence agencies failed to classify potential threats. Some of the Paris 
attacks terrorists were known by both French and Belgian authorities for previous terrorist 
activities. Nevertheless, they were not considered imminent threats. The fact they were 
able to bomb the stadium with the President of France inside, demonstrates a huge lack 
of efficient security measures by the French body of police. The preparators of the Paris 
attacks moved freely in the Schengen, without being monitored.  
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Quite often suspects of terrorism are known by authorities. In the case of the Paris attacks, 
the Turkish intelligence alerted Europe that these individuals fought in Iraq and in Syria 
alongside the so-called Islamic State. Nevertheless, no cooperation measure was taken by 
the European authorities. There was no interest in sharing information or coordinating 
efforts to keep these individuals monitored. They were arrested and stopped for terrorism 
previous to the Paris attacks. Still, national intelligence agencies were not willing to share 
this kind of information with the other Member States, with the EU or even with Europol. 
Clearly, there is a need to strengthen counter-terrorism intelligence, mechanisms and 
institutions within the European Union. To increase efficiency in counter-terrorism there 
must be a higher commitment for coordination and cooperation. A borderless response to 
borderless terrorism (Bures, 2016). 
 
 
 
Chapter V: EU Counter-Terrorism 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses mainly on the EU counter-terrorism measures adopted after the 
Paris attacks, and the subchapter is divided into two periods. The immediate response to 
the 2015 Paris attacks and the EU counter-terrorism policies developed after it. This 
chapter also explores the need to respond to the vulnerabilities caused by the lack of 
cooperation anterior to the attacks.  
 
 
 
First Response after the Paris Attacks 
 
 
The 2015 Paris attacks atrocities called for emergency measures. It resulted in debates 
about the EU’s role in fighting terrorism in Europe (Bigo et. al., 2015). Because the 
refugee crisis was also going on at the same time, many people questioned the benefits of 
freedom of movement within the Schengen Area and the EU asylum system. On 20th 
November 2015, the Council came up with the Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism. The 
measures included to strengthen the control of the external borders and to monitor cross-
border movements. Public opinion called for the regulation of individuals consistently 
travelling inside the EU borders and also overseas, especially to countries like Iraq and 
Syria.  
 
The connection between terrorist activities and cross-border free movement became very 
clear after the Paris attacks. To prioritize intelligence gathering and surveillance was the 
first EU response to the attacks. An example of it was the EU Passenger Name Record 
(EU PNR) which created a database of transcripts on the travels of EU citizens and EU 
residents flying inside and outside EU countries. It also led to reform of the judicial and 
police approach to transnational criminality. EU leaders concluded these methods of 
dealing with the current security challenges were insufficient and inefficient. One more 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                                                                                                                     Nº 6/2019, 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2019 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
  
 
20 
 
time they perceived the necessity in deepening intelligence sharing between Member 
States. 
 
The terrorist attacks in Paris exposed the difficult relation between fundamental rights, 
freedom of movement, privacy and security (Carrera and Guild, 2014). The European 
Commission’s Recommendation after the attacks centred on the further the use of existing 
mechanisms such as the SIS II (Schengen Information System). Finally, the Commission 
suggested to urgently return to the system of tracking the movement of third countries 
nationals across the EU external borders, the “smart borders package” (Bigo et. al., 2015). 
Similarly, the Commission urged Member States to collaborate and harmonized models 
of border administration, in order to intensify effectiveness in the fight against terrorism 
in Europe.  
 
Boosting the works of Europol and Eurojust were also seen as an important measure to 
respond to the Paris attacks. The Europol gained a European Counter Terrorism Center 
(ECTC) and an EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU). The EU IRU established propose is 
to coordinate criteria of identification of terrorist and extreme violent individuals online, 
working closely with significant stakeholders. Plus, to provide strategies and support 
competent authorities. Other initiatives, such as the European Cybercrime Center (EC3) 
had their importance reinforced. The implementation of the Prüm Decision (Bigo et. al., 
2015). The Prüm decision intends to increase cross-border cooperation within EU States’ 
judicial and police bodies to fight terrorist operations and other criminal activities more 
efficiently. The main proposal of the decision is to automatise the exchange of 
intelligence (Decision 2008/615/JHA). 
 
The Justice and Home Affairs Council backed the Commission Conclusions on Counter-
Terrorism. Furthermore, it campaigned for the Member States to adopt these measures 
before the end of 2015. Likewise, the Council asked the Commission to include EU 
citizens in the decision-making of the smart borders proposal and to reexamine article 7of 
the Schengen Borders Code (Bigo et. al., 2015). Additionally, to give a more solid base 
for the mandate of Frontex in order to challenge terrorist and criminal organizations in 
Europe. Another judicial measure taken by the EU Council was to complement criminal 
justice in terrorist-related matters, such as radicalization. The measure was focused on 3 
main points of orientation. First one was to structure and organize detention regimes. The 
second one was to establish an alternative to detention regimes, especially for those 
foreign fighters returning to the EU. The third one was to create measures to improve 
integration, rehabilitation and reintegration of radicals (Bigo et. al., 2015). 
The European Parliament participated in the EU response to the Paris attacks by 
emphasizing the above-cited orientations and voting on the draft on prevention of 
radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations 
(2015/2063(INI)). Likewise, the European Parliament underlined the relevance of the 
improvement of the EU PNR proposal. Foreign fighters homecoming was also of concern 
to the Parliament. Therefore, a blacklisting system to establish judicial control over the 
fighters was requested. Subsequently, a call for Member States to not place radicals 
together with other criminals in prison in order to prevent prison radicalization was made. 
The European extreme right reacted to the Paris attacks by criticizing the EU’s freedom 
of movement and the EU’s approach to the ongoing refugee crisis. The French National 
Front’s Marine Le Pen campaigned for the reestablishment of national border controls. 
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Meanwhile, more conservative Member States such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
required the EU to stop the implementation of the EU temporary relocation system of 
redistribution of asylum seekers (Carrera and Guild, 2015). That is because, Ahmad al 
Mohammad (not his real name) used a fake Syrian passport to return to Europe and carry 
out the attacks on the 13th November 2015 in Paris (CNN, 2017).  
 
The EU was then facing a dilemma. Its initial reaction was to accept the criticisms and 
the requests made by European extreme right and conservatives. Nevertheless, the EU 
leaders recall on Member States’ responsibilities in the refugee crisis. During the G20 
meeting on November 2015 Commission’s President, Jean-Claude Juncker said “I try to 
make it crystal clear that we should not mix the different categories of people coming to 
Europe. The one who is responsible for the attacks in Paris cannot be put on an equal 
footing with real refugees, with asylum seekers and with displaced people. These are 
criminals and not refugees or asylum seekers. I would like to invite those in Europe who 
are trying to change the migration agenda we have adopted – I would like to invite them 
to be serious about this and not to give in to these basic reactions. I do not like it.” The 
cross-border policies were, however, closely related to transnational mobility and 
external border control. 
 
 
Counter-terrorism Policies after the Paris attacks 
 
 
The EU counter-terrorism policies are based on four main pillars. To prevent, to protect, 
to pursue and to respond. The first one refers to the prevention of radicalization of 
individuals. The second pillar consists of the protection of citizens and infrastructure. The 
third one is in relation to the investigation and the dismantling of terrorist organizations. 
The fourth pillar commits to control and reduce the consequences of acts of terrorism 
(Boutin et. al., 2016). In order to achieve these four goals, the EU establishes well-defined 
policies to accomplish each one of them. 
 
To address the prevention of radicalization, the EU extended the list of terrorist offences 
(Sadet, 2017). For example, to travel or help someone to travel inside or outside the EU 
for extreme intentions, to train or being trained for terrorist purposes, or to finance or 
collect funds for Jihadist aims are crimes. Member States are now obligated to make 
checks on EU and non-EU citizens entering the EU’s borders. Then, this information 
must be verified on the SIS II and the Interpol database (Cerdeira, 2017). Another 
measure taken by the EU is to further control of firearms. The Council amended the 
directive 91/477(EC) on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons by adopting 
the Directive 2017/853. The purpose of the directive 2017/853 is to efficiently trace 
firearms and make access to firearms difficult for terrorists and other criminal 
organizations. Also, it limits the use of various semi-automatics by putting them in 
categories, in this case, category A, banning their use by civilians. 
 
To protect, the second pillar is sort of an extension of the first one. External border control 
is also an aim. However, It incorporates the goal to secure transport and critical 
infrastructure. The Council approved the Directive 2016/681 on the use of passenger 
name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
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terrorist offences and serious crime. By adopting this directive, the EU intends to fulfil 
security gaps in the combat of transnational crimes. Intelligence must be processed at the 
national level and shared within EU institutions and Europol (European Council, 2017). 
Nevertheless, critics argue the EU cannot advocate for the protection of fundamental 
rights while it is increasing securitization measures. According to them, it is paradoxical 
and the effectiveness of these measures can be easily questioned.  
 
In order to make it difficult for a terrorist to plan and carry out attacks in Europe, the third 
pillar advocates disturbing the access of terrorist organization to funds. By improving 
transparency and to assist linkage in terms of trust ownership and company (Abdelsamad, 
2018). In addition to that, the EU wants to remove the anonymity factor of 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin by forcing virtual currency exchange platforms to apply 
to EU norms. Azan and Liv (2018) claim it is difficult to make crypto money platforms 
comply with EU law for two reasons. Firstly, they are not subject to any national 
jurisdiction and have a global range. Secondly, being anonymous is the basic nature of 
these kinds of currencies.  
 
The European Council aims to promote the fourth pillar, to respond, by increasing 
efficiency and coordination when dealing with a terrorist attack situation, focusing mainly 
on the victims’ necessities (European Council, 2017). It aims to broaden the response 
apparatus and showcase the best practices on “assistance to victims of terrorism” 
(European Council, 2017. Additionally, the EU seeks to strengthen cooperation with third 
countries. It has agreements on the transfer of personal data with Lebanon, Jordan, 
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey (European Union External Action, 
2017). 
 
The Council of the European Union, the Eurojust and the Europol are the most important 
counter-terrorism institution at the European level (Rehak, Foltin and Holcner, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the Member States have much more competence individually in counter-
terrorism than any EU institution. In terms of the design, creation, implementation and 
the adherence of counter-terrorism policies EU countries are responsible to determinate 
what they will or will not adopt. The same goes to intelligence sharing (Boutin et. al., 
2016).  Abdelsamad (2018) argues the EU authority is purely to coordinate counter-
terrorism strategies within Member States and try to make them apply similar counter-
terrorism schemes. However, the EU still dominates regarding intelligence sharing, 
counter policy control and cooperation support. 
 
While Eurojust and Europol’s role is to provide support to Member States in counter-
terrorism issues, the EU counter-terrorism coordinator has to recommend, provide legal 
assistance to EU members and prioritize fields of counter-terrorism operational plan 
(Boutin et. al., 2016).  The counter-terrorism coordinator works under the supervision of 
the Council of the European Union. Nonetheless, the European Counter Terrorism Center 
(ECTC) was created in 2016 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and it is 
administrated by the Europol (Europol, 2017). The aim of the ECTC is to share and 
analyze intelligence and also to integrate and organize action plans in terrorism-related 
matters (Burkov, 2016). 
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Regardless of all the counter-terrorism apparatus, the EU has created in order to fight 
terrorism in Europe, the lack of political will of the European governments in cooperating, 
thus, making them work is still very low. If there is no change in the attitude of Member 
States in terms of cooperation and information sharing, EU mechanisms to fight 
homegrown terrorism and radicalization will demonstrate themselves to be limited to 
short-term responses with no continuous counter-terrorism outcome. It is extremely 
challenging to keep a borderless and terrorist free Europe if the EU Member States do not 
decide to take strong action regarding counter-terrorism policies and cooperation. 
Terrorist groups have proved they have a sophisticated engine to execute violent attacks 
on European soil. Likewise, terrorist cells have a very complex network of material, 
propaganda and contact. They have outsmarted European intelligence agencies on many 
occasions. The 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 Brussels attacks are examples of it.  
 
 
 
Chapter VI: Other mechanisms 
 
 
Chapter number six analyzes other counter-terrorism mechanisms within the EU system. 
It considers two aspects of it as the most important. The first subchapter, explains the 
role of Europol in the fight against Islamist terrorism. The second one, and subchapter 
number 2 of this chapter is about the cooperation among the European Union and the 
United States. Hence, how aligned interests convert into efficient counter-terrorism 
measures.  
 
 
 
Europol 
 
 
The European Police Office (Europol)  was formally established in 1995 by the Europol 
Convention signed by Representatives of the Governments of EU members (Council, 
1995). The idea was to create a European law enforcement organization to assist 
cooperation among Member States in matters of drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
terrorism and other security-related issues. The main aim of Europol was to promote 
effective cooperation between national police of Member States in order to prevent and 
combat organized crime acting inside the EU’s borders. Like Interpol or other 
international police organization, Europol cannot carry out arrests or conduct its own 
investigations (Kaunert, 2010). 
 
In the beginning, countries like Belgium and France did not want to include terrorism in 
the competences of the Europol, as they considered it a matter of national sovereignty. 
However, other members, such as Spain was advocating for terrorism to be included 
among Europol’s responsibilities (Kaunert, 2010). It was only in 1999, before all EU 
members ratified the Europol Convention, that terrorism was incorporated to the tasks of 
Europol. Nevertheless, it was not until the events of 9/11 that EU members adopted a 
common definition of terrorism. 
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After 9/11 the Council approved measures of counter-terrorism that strengthened the role 
of Europol in it (Bosilca, 2013). Home Affairs and Justice ministers from all over the EU 
called for more information sharing and cooperation between domestic intelligence 
services of Member States and Europol (European Council, 2001. In November 2001 a 
Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) also developed from the EU’s response to 9/11. 
The aim of the CTTF was to receive and collect intelligence, while Europol was 
responsible to coordinate counter-terrorism tasks within the Task Force and Member 
States national authorities (Bensahel, 2003). Nevertheless, the CTTF failed to deliver its 
works efficiently and it was eventually suspended. With the suspension of the CTTFF, 
Europol received many of its responsibilities (Bosilca, 2013). EU Member States could 
not agree on the size of the scope of Europol’s work. Germany, for instance, wanted 
Europol to be an autonomous FBI-like organization, while other countries, like the United 
Kingdom, argued Europol’s role should only be coordination.  It soon became clear that 
national intelligence services were not keen to cooperate with Europol (De Kerchove, 
2008). 
 
Following the Madrid attacks of 2004, European leaders acknowledged the need to 
improve intelligence sharing and to strengthen Europol in terms of counter-terrorism 
capacities. Nonetheless, the attacks demonstrated the lack of interest on the part of 
domestic intelligence services to cooperate with each other. In this case, for example, the 
Spanish police declined to pass information onto the French authorities on the type of 
bombs used in the attacks(Fägersten, 2010). In addition, domestic intelligence services 
were resistant to transfer important information and data to Europol. Even though, the 
EU’s countries leaders themselves advocated for the improvement of cooperation with 
Europol. Europol communicated to the Council its frustration with the lack of support 
from national security and intelligence agencies of the Member States. According to 
Europol, the unwillingness of domestic services to collaborate was an obstacle in its 
exercising of competence as a counter-terrorism actor (Europol, 2005). 
 
Prior to the London attacks in 2005, the Council of the European Union adopted the 
European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which included objectives such as 
increasing information exchange and the assistance of the EU members’ national 
intelligence and security services (Bosilca, 2013). The European Commission 
campaigned for compulsory information sharing to Europol on terrorism-related matters. 
Nevertheless, Member States were reluctant to support it. Fägersten (2010) argued they 
provided Europol with very limited information or simply did not adhere to the 
Commission´s initiative, which led consequently to its withdrawal. 2009 was an 
important year for Europol in many aspects. On the legal basis, Europol developed 
officially into an EU agency by becoming EU’s competence under the Lisbon Treaty 
(Council Decision 2009/371/JHA). As a consequence, Europol was able to act in the areas 
of information collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange, and in police 
cooperation matters.  It was decided Europol had the relevant operational capability to 
deal with terrorism-related issues, thus, Member States were encouraged to work closer 
to it for counter-terrorism purposes. Europol was slowly gaining relevance on European 
counter-terrorism. 
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On 11th May 2016, the European Parliament voted to strengthen Europol’s powers, and 
together with the Council, it adopted the Europol new Regulation, which established 
Europol as the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. The new 
Regulation came into effect on May 2017 and offered significant structural reforms on 
Europol’s functionality (Europol, 2017). The main task of Europol would be to continue 
to support Member States in the prevention of transnational criminal activities, such as 
terrorism and other forms of organized crimes. However, the new Regulation was 
formulated to facilitate Europol’s preparation of specialized units in order to improve its 
response to terrorist threats. 
 
The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and the European Union Internet 
Referral Unit (EU IRU) were also established in 2017, under Europol control (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/794). The main tasks of the ECTC are to supply Member States with 
operational support for counter-terrorism investigations when requested, intelligence 
exchange and terrorism expertise, to boost international cooperation on counter-terrorism, 
to stop foreign fighters and illegal arms trafficking. The ECTC together with the Internet 
Referral combat online Jihadist propaganda. It counted with a great number of specialist 
and analysts on terrorism activities (Europol, 2019).  
 
Nevertheless, some barriers to counter-terrorism intelligence exchange within Europol 
can still be noticed. Bures (2016), claims one thing is Europol’s counter-terrorism 
mandate, another thing is relevant national actors to complying with it. According to him, 
the issue with Europol is that it was not formed by security authorities, such as police 
officers but it was a top-down decision by the EU’s political elite. Thus, national law 
enforcement and intelligence services of Member States have a degree of distrust on 
Europol as it can be sometimes perceived as more of a political than law enforcement 
body. Moreover, the difference in the organizational structure of national political, 
administrative and judicial bodies of each Member States increases bureaucracy within 
Europol’s mechanisms of intelligence sharing (Bures, 2016). That is because in some EU 
countries the police are responsible for counter-terrorism while in others, intelligence 
services are. As a consequence, different types of information are gathered depending on 
the interests of each institution. 
 
 
 
EU-US cooperation 
 
 
 
As a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) and the increase 
in the terrorist threat in both the US and Europe, deeper cooperation in regards to counter-
terrorism was developed between the two. Since then, meetings between EU and US 
officials on counter terrorism-related matters have become more and more habitual. Plus, 
the EU and the US adopted many agreements on the exchange of information between 
European and American intelligence agencies and police officers. Treaties on mutual 
legal assistance and extraditions were signed by both parties. The list of cooperation 
between the EU and the US also includes airline passenger data, terrorism financing, 
CEI INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                                                                                                                                     Nº 6/2019, 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2019 
COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL 
MÁSTER EN DIPLOMACIA Y FUNCIÓN PÚBLICA INTERNACIONAL 
  
 
26 
 
transport security and the phenomenon of foreign fighter and accords on container 
security (Archick, 2014). 
 
Dialogues between all levels of officials working on border control, police or judicial 
matters from both the EU and the US has strengthened the European-Americans relations. 
Meetings between EU and US high-level officials are held at least once a year and every 
six months between working-level officials. In addition to that, Europol sent two liaison 
officers to the American capital to work on counter-terrorism and 14 US officers were 
posted in the headquarters of Europol and Eurojust in The Hague, the Netherlands.  
 
In relation to strategic information exchange, such as crime patterns and threat evaluation, 
Europol is the EU agent in terms of EU-US counter-terrorism partnership (Kaunert, 
2010). Europol signed two agreements with the US in 2001 and 2002 on intelligence 
cooperation. These agreements consisted of the transfer of intelligence such as names, 
addresses and criminal records. The negotiation of these agreements was especially 
challenging to the US since the EU has higher standards of data protection. In the EU, the 
privacy of personal data is considered as a basic right, which means regulations were 
adopted in order to keep this kind of information private and away from law enforcement 
authorities. In 2007, both the European Union and the United States agreed to approve 
common standards for strategic and classified information.  
 
When it comes to law enforcement the EU and the US have a number of mutual legal 
assistance and extradition agreements. However, the US had to agree on not applying the 
death penalty on any suspect individuals extradited from an EU member, since it is 
against EU law. Also, under these agreements, EU citizens must be extradited to 
European soil. Even if there is a bilateral agreement between a Member State and the US 
on the matter of extradition the EU-US agreement had to prevail. In terms of mutual legal 
assistance treaties, the EU and the US have established to facilitate the purchase of 
evidence between both parties ((Archick, 2014). It includes access to bank account and 
other financial information in case of a criminal investigation. This means the EU and the 
US would allow each other to participate and collaborate in investigations related to 
transnational crimes, especially terrorism. In 2015 Europol and the US agreed on to 
cooperate in fighting foreign fighters and illegal immigration (Archick, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, the difference in capabilities of law enforcement institutions of the EU and 
the US may disturb the efficiency of the EU and US counter-terrorism cooperation. For 
example, the FBI and the CIA have much more autonomy and capacities than Europol. 
Europol depends on the work of national security authorities of Member States and their 
inclination to share information with it.  Thus, the FBI and the CIA have more chances 
to provide relevant information and to foresee terrorist threats. Another related issue is, 
Europeans complain the US is willing to receive intelligence but also a bit resistant when 
it comes to sharing their information. 
 
Regarding terrorist financing, the EU had agreed to guarantee the US means of access to 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), which is 
a consortium of international banks based in Brussels. The US Treasury Department’s 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) is able to access the information of SWIFT, 
which has helped in over seven thousand investigations of both EU and US authorities. 
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In addition to that, the EU and the US collaborate through other instruments, such as the 
United Nations and the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (Congressional 
Research Service, 2016). 
 
Concerning terrorist groups and individuals the EU and the US cooperate by sharing their 
list of suspect groups and individuals operating in Europe and in the United States 
(Congressional Research Service, 2016). The list consists of names of individuals and 
groups associated with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban in the post 9/11 and 
more recently to the so-called Islamic State and Boko Haram. Critics argue that is 
important because it presents a united front against terrorists. The EU elaborates two lists, 
one with individuals and one of the groups. For someone or an entity to be part of the EU 
common terrorist list, all Member States must agree. It has caused some occasional 
disagreement between European and American authorities. For some EU members, for 
example, Hamas-related charities are not to be considered terrorist, while Hamas itself is. 
However, the EU generally accepts to add to its lists an individual or an entity the US 
considers as terrorists. 
 
In terms of aviation, air cargo security the EU and the US have implemented a significant 
number of security measures. Since the 9/11 aviation and air cargo safety became a 
concern to both Europeans and Americans. EU and US regulations have coincided on 
these matters many times. However, two other events increased the EU and the US 
attention on these matters. In 2009, when a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit received 
terrorist threats from one Nigerian passenger and in 2010 when two packages containing 
explosives were found on cargo planes and a passenger flight. In 2012 the EU and the US 
signed an agreement to deepen cooperation on air cargo security. The agreement consists 
of recognizing each others air cargo regimes and exchange the progress of it. Another 
measure is when in 2011 the European Parliament voted in favour of body scanners at 
EU airports as a safeguard measure. The US had implemented the same measure in 2009.  
The EU and US cooperation in counter-terrorism are perceived by both parties as having 
a significant effect on the fight against terrorist activities in Europe and in the US.  
 
According to Rees (2008), the EU and the US counter-terrorism cooperation is the best 
example of its kind in the international scenario. Some challenges are still noted, 
especially on how the EU and the US interpret some terrorism threats and the response to 
it. For instance, the EU is less in favour of taking military actions for counter-terrorism 
measures while Americans seem to be very comfortable with it. However, as appointed 
to Rees (2008) one can say the EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation has been very 
effective. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VII: Conclusions 
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The European Union (EU) has certainly become an important actor in terms of counter-
terrorism, especially inside Europe. Since the events of 9/11, the EU managed to 
dramatically improve its counter-terrorism institutions and mechanisms. When Europe 
suffered from its first big Jihadist attacks the EU accomplished to react rapidly. In 
addition, the Treaty of Lisbon was truly game-changing regarding the EU capacities in 
implementing more efficient counter-terrorist measures. Most importantly, the EU gained 
the legal basis necessary to legitimately act in the fight against Jihadist terrorism in 
Europe and outside it. Nevertheless, an analysis of official EU documents and of the 
literature suggests the EU’s power over counter-terrorism policy is not as great as its 
instruments suggest. 
 
Some relevant structural problems can still be noticed concerning EU’s ability in 
answering to Islamist terrorism threats. For instance, Member States still feel reluctant 
when it comes to information sharing. Primarily because there is a strong perception that 
security is highly related to sovereignty. Even though the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EU 
the capacity to take measures of security and justice into its own hands, Member States 
prefer to make decisions of counter-terrorism at the national level. It means that all the 
counter-terrorism mechanisms the EU have created depend on the political will of the 
Member States. 
 
Furthermore, some authors suggest there is a certain degree of distrust among EU 
members’ police and intelligence bodies and the European Union. For example, strategic 
information should be exchanged with EU agencies, such as Europol. But, because of its 
political weight, and because Europol was created through a top-down decision, police 
and intelligence services do not really perceive Europol as equal. 
 
In addition to that, each Member State has its own institutional structure regarding 
counter-terrorism police. In some EU countries, the police are responsible for gathering 
information and fighting radical Islamist terror, while in other countries there are diverse 
institutions in charge of the same tasks. It translates into two distinct problems. Firstly, 
the quality of information. Different institutions can have divergent interests concerning 
information gathering and exchange. Secondly, is the institutional bureaucracy it imposes 
to EU agencies.  
 
Another challenge is the fact the EU does not have an institution solely responsible for 
counter-terrorism. The institutional structure of the EU again plays a role here. Counter-
terrorism measures are taken on different levels. It has to pass through all the 
administration configuration of each Member States and also through the bureaucratic 
organization of the EU. The outcome is these measures need a bit more centralization. 
For that, more autonomy for Europol and Eurojust could have a more effective impact. It 
would also ease the cooperation between US agencies such as the FBI or CIA and 
Europol, for example. It would balance Europol’s capacity when comparing to one of 
these agencies. 
 
Nevertheless, when put in context, European integration and counter-terrorism 
cooperation are still very inspiring accomplishments. There are things that need 
improvement, however, to harmonize 28 different countries’ counter-terrorism police is 
an extremely difficult task. Plus, over the last decades' integration and cooperation in all 
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areas have only increased, which is a good sign. For instance, terrorist attacks have 
considerably decreased. It is difficult to prove through data that the cause of this downturn 
in terrorist attacks is only due to European integration. Other variables have to be taken 
into account like the many lost the so called-Islamic State have suffered in Iraq and Syria. 
Nevertheless, the improvements in the EU counter-terrorism cannot be denied. Trends 
show it will continue to do so. 
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